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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ORDERING CHAOS AT SEA: PREPARING FOR SOMALI PIRATE
ATTACKS THROUGH PRAGMATIC INSURANCE POLICIES
INTRODUCTION
Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse, a young Somali man, made headlines in the
United States in April 2009 when he and three co-conspirators held Captain
Richard Phillips of the American-flagged Maersk Alabama hostage for nearly
four days.1 Of four attackers, Muse is the only surviving pirate.2 The Navy
brought Muse to the United States to stand trial.3 On May 19, 2009, a grand
jury indicted Muse for conspiracy to violently seize a ship, conspiracy to hold
a hostage, aiding and abetting a plot to hold a hostage, and unlawfully
discharging a firearm.4 The United States has the legal authority to try
individuals for piracy on the high seas.5
The attack on the Maersk Alabama was the first Somali pirate attack to
attract real media attention in the United States, possibly because compared to
other shipping nations, the number of American-controlled ships that have
been attacked by Somali pirates is relatively small.6 Arguably the most
interesting aspect of the Maersk Alabama incident was that it was an anomaly
among the modern piracy that occurs daily in the Gulf of Aden: The Navy
intervened (rather daringly), and no one paid ransom.7 In many piracies in the
area, insurers (and sometimes governments) negotiate with the pirates and pay

1. Robert D. McFadden & Scott Shane, Navy Rescues Captain, Killing Three Pirate
Captors, Navy Kills 3 Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, at A1.
2. Benjamin Weiser, A Young Somali in Manhattan, To Face U.S. Charges of Piracy, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at A1.
3. Id. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 100, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
4. The charges were brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (life sentence for piracy), § 2280
(committing violence against a ship), § 924 (unlawfully discharging a firearm), and § 1203
(hostage taking). Indictment at 1–2, 4, 6–7, United States v. Muse, No. 09-cr-512 (S.D.N.Y. May
19, 2009), available at http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1160.pdf.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (Congress may “punish Piracies and Felonies committed
upon the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”).
6. See ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS ANNUAL
REPORT: 1 JANUARY–31 DECEMBER 2009 16–17 (2010) [hereinafter ICC ANNUAL REPORT]
(noting that in 2009, the United States had four ships attacked out of a total of 406 attacks).
7. McFadden & Shane, supra note 1.
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

666

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:665

ransoms.8 While it is expensive to pay ransom, it is cheaper than changing
shipping routes.9 Insurers and shipping interests therefore seem willing to take
the risk of encountering pirates for expediency’s sake, emboldening the pirates
with a sense of success. In 2009, 217 of the 406 reported pirate attacks
worldwide were attributed to Somali pirates, compared with only 51 Somaliattributed attacks in 2007.10
Additionally, this is a new incarnation of piracy, an ancient crime, and
marine insurance and domestic and international law have yet to evolve
accordingly. Traditionally, piracy was a violent attack on a ship aimed at
procuring the vessel or the cargo onboard.11 Somali pirates have taken on a
new strategy somewhere between terrorism (defined as violence undertaken for
political ends12) and traditional piracy (violent armed robberies13).14
Somali piracy has become an attractive career choice for young Somali
men. Twelve percent of the world’s daily oil supply moves through the Gulf
of Aden.15 After years of war without a functioning central government,
lawlessness is rampant.16 Piracy is now so lucrative that the bandits set up an
investment exchange where people can invest in particular attacks without
8. See Alan Cowell, Pirates Attack Maersk Alabama Again, NYTIMES.COM (Nov. 18,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/world/africa/19pirates.html?_r=1&emc=eta1 (noting
that there were rumors of the Spanish government paying a $3.5 million ransom for the release of
a Spanish crew); see also RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OCEAN PIRACY AND ITS
IMPACT ON INSURANCE 3 (2009) (noting that London based shipping firms are willing to pay
ransom because their hull insurance policies cover piracy and will reimburse them).
9. James W. Carbin, Pirates: Hostis Humanis Generis, FED. LAW., Sept. 2009, at 50, 53.
10. ICC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 5–6, 21. The International Criminal Court (ICC)
notes that the Somali pirates were responsible for attacks in Somalia, the Gulf of Aden, the Red
Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and Oman. Id. at 21.
11. Phillip A. Buhler, New Struggle with and Old Menace: Towards a Revised Definition of
Maritime Piracy, CURRENTS: INT’L. TRADE L.J., Winter 1999, at 61, 64.
12. Leticia M. Diaz & Barry Hart Dubner, An Examination of the Evolution of Crimes at Sea
and the Emergence of the Many Legal Regimes in Their Wake, 34 N.C. J. INT’L. L. & COM. REG.
521, 539–40 (2009).
13. Id.
14. One author argues that this new hijack-for-ransom strategy results from the pirates’
inability to maneuver large cargo vessels or to sell large amounts of stolen goods. Carbin, supra
note 9, at 55. But see Somalia: Pirates Attack Oil Tanker, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2009, at A10
(intimating that Somali pirates are becoming increasingly sophisticated, at least with regard to
weaponry).
15. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Piracy Repression, Partnering and the Law, 40 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 43, 43 (2009).
16. Gwen Thompkins, Morning Edition: Battling Piracy Around the World: In Somalia,
Piracy is an Attractive Career Option (NPR radio broadcast May 6, 2009), transcript available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103815312&sc=emaf. The Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, elected in early 2009, consented to the United Nations
recommendation that member nation ships freely traverse its territorial waters to police them. See
S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008).
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directly participating in the violence, taking a percentage of the money earned
if the attack is successful.17 International law is evolving to protect seafaring
vessels and their crews, but these legal frameworks evolve slowly, and
frequently are riddled with reservations by individual nations who wish to
apply their domestic laws in lieu of certain compact provisions.18 The United
States is cooperating with other nations to patrol the area and arrest pirates
where possible.19 Additionally, the Maritime Safety Commission (Horn of
Africa) (MSCHOA) established a recommended travel corridor that is
patrolled continually by the participating nations.20 Despite these precautions,
attacks have still occurred in the patrolled area.21 The Gulf is very large, and
the pirates have been moving further and further offshore.22
While the United Nations and its Member States work out the best way to
control and punish pirates, insurers continue to pay ransoms.23 Insurers have
passed these costs on to ship owners: premiums for voyages through the Gulf
of Aden have increased tenfold since 2005.24 Logically, then, these increases
are likely passed on to manufacturers in the form of increased shipping costs
and general average expenses, and finally to the end purchasers of the cargo. It
is reasonable that the costs of this danger will be spread among those who
undertake the risk. However, insurers could accomplish this risk and cost
spreading more efficiently with better tailored, more specific policies. Though
paying ransom undoubtedly perpetuates the cycle of piracy-for-ransom, there
is an understandable serious concern for human life. Insurers should pay these
demands only in very specific instances to incentivize training and preventive
measures, and marine insurance policies should be tailored to this end. This
would be a helpful stopgap while the international community learns to thwart
the marauders effectively.
This Comment will outline the international response thus far to the
situation off the coast of Somalia. After a brief history of marine insurance,
exposing the complicated underlying policy and economic issues implicated in
17. Mohamed Ahmed, Somali Sea Gangs Lure Investors at Pirate Lair, REUTERS (Dec. 1,
2009, 2:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5B01Z920091201?rpc=60.
18. See Patrick J.S. Griggs, Uniformity of Maritime Law—An International Perspective, 73
TUL. L. REV. 1551, 1562 (1999) (discussing difficulties in writing effective conventions in light
of each individual country’s needs).
19. S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008).
20. Piracy Prone Areas and Warnings, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS., http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=70&Itemid=58 (last visited June 20,
2011).
21. Id.
22. Somalia: Pirates Attack Oil Tanker, supra note 14 (describing an attempt to attack an oil
tanker approximately 1000 nautical miles from the Somali shore).
23. See Carbin, supra note 9, at 54.
24. Michael H. Passman, Interpreting Sea Piracy Clauses in Marine Insurance Contracts,
40 J. MAR. L. & COM. 59, 59 (2009).
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insuring modern voyages, this Comment will examine some other major crises
that affected marine insurance and how insurers dealt with those situations.
Finally, the author will recommend ways insurers (using the American system)
can best protect their clients’—and their own—interests when contracting for
voyages around the Horn of Africa.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO SOMALI PIRACY
A.

In General

Though piracy has plagued the seas for millennia,25 incidents in the mid- to
late-twentieth century were so rare that some United Nations delegates thought
pirates no longer deserved the description hostis humani generis (the enemy of
all).26 Even during this time, piracy still occurred to a lesser degree in
Southeast Asia and some South American ports.27 Piracy in Somalia began in
the early 1990s in the form of hostage-taking for ransom in Somali territorial
waters,28 allegedly to protect the coastal waters from illegal dumping and
overfishing that had devastated the local fisheries.29 The pirate activity in the
area continued at low levels during the next fifteen years, but increased
substantially in 2006.30 In 2009, there were 217 attempted attacks and 47
successful attacks in Somali waters, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Indian
Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and Oman, all perpetuated by Somali pirates, resulting
in 867 hostages taken in 2009.31 The resurgence has been attributed to the
poor economy and lack of effective government in the country.32 Despite the
danger, major shipping companies have continued to use the route from the
Suez Canal to the Middle East: Approximately 50,000 ships and 12% of the
world’s daily oil moves through this treacherous area.33 However, some
companies, including Maersk and Odfjell, are considering altering their
25. Homer mentions pirates in the Iliad. HOMER, THE ILIAD (H.F. Cary, A.M. ed.,
Alexander Pope trans., George Routledge and Sons 1872); see also Carbin, supra note 9, at 51.
26. Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of
Somalia, 20 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 399, 399–400 (2009).
27. See I.R. Hyslop, Contemporary Piracy, in PIRACY AT SEA 3, 16–18 (Eric Ellen ed.,
1989).
28. Per UNCLOS, a nation’s territorial waters extend up to twelve nautical miles from the
coastline. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 3. An additional twelve miles are considered contiguous
zones, where states may patrol to enforce certain laws (immigration, customs, sanitation, and
fiscal). Id. art. 33. Other nations may freely enter the twelve-mile contiguous zone, but not the
twelve-mile territorial waters. See id. arts. 25, 111. Piracies committed in territorial waters are
subject to domestic laws. Id. art. 25.
29. Treves, supra note 26, at 400.
30. Id. at 399–400.
31. ICC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 12–13, 25.
32. See Thompkins, supra note 16; Treves, supra note 26, at 400.
33. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 15, at 43.
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shipping routes, possibly foregoing the Suez Canal for significantly longer
trips around the Cape of Good Hope at a higher cost.34 One author noted:
As the shipping industry confronts volatile fuel costs, plummeting freight rates,
container ship surpluses and dramatically increased insurance premiums,
protecting their ships, crew and cargo remains a paramount concern.
Determining the most effective way forward, while challenging, has brought
unprecedented partnering. Industry representatives such as the Baltic and
International Maritime Council (BIMCO) suggest that naval powers are
responsible for keeping the sea lanes free, and maritime states should begin to
35
work more closely to accomplish the counter-piracy mission.

B.

United Nations and Other Public Bodies

As noted above, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), territorial waters extend twelve nautical miles from a
sovereign state’s coastline.36 For any nation to prosecute individuals for
piracy, the act of depredation must have occurred on the “high seas”—outside
the territorial waters of any nation.37 In the early escalation of attacks, Somali
pirates sometimes escaped capture by towing or running hijacked vessels into
Somali territorial waters, evading international interveners and thus,
prosecution under international law.38 United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1816, approved June 2, 2008, allows certain states to enter Somali
territorial waters to repress piracy or armed robbery at sea, using any method
allowed under UNCLOS.39 This essentially eliminates the “high seas” hurdle
to international prosecution for piracy offenses. The Security Council has
promulgated further resolutions, including Resolution 1851 on December 16,
2008.40 In this resolution, the Security Council reaffirms its disapproval of the
piracy; recognizes the sovereignty of the Somali Transitional Federal
Government (TFG); encourages states to cooperate with the TFG in
suppressing piracy; and encourages nations to prosecute pirates.41
Additionally, this resolution notes that “lack of capacity, domestic legislation,
and clarity about how to dispose of pirates after their capture, has hindered
more robust international action against the pirates off the coast of Somalia and
in some cases led to pirates being released without facing justice.”42 The
resolution also “[n]otes with concern the findings . . . of the Monitoring Group
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 46.
Id.
UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 3.
Id. arts. 100–01.
Treves, supra note 26, at 403–04.
S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 16, ¶ 7.
S.C. Res. 1851, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008).
Id.
Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

670

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:665

on Somalia that escalating ransom payments are fuelling the growth of piracy
in waters off the coast of Somalia.”43 The International Maritime Organization
(IMO), a United Nations specialized agency focusing on international
shipping, called a conference in Djibouti in January 2009, which resulted in a
Code of Conduct to guide member states in coordinating efforts against the
pirates, though their plans for implementation are still in the infant stage.44
The IMO also published recommendations for ships’ masters in order to avoid
piracy, encouraging evasive maneuvering, using long-range acoustic devices,
and installing netting or electric fences.45
In the United States, the National Security Council promulgated guidelines
entitled “Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action
Plan” in December 2008 to build upon the United States Piracy Policy
President George W. Bush signed in mid-2007.46 This plan
seeks to . . . establish and maintain a contact group; strengthen and encourage
the use of the maritime security patrol area (MSPA) in the Gulf of Aden;
support and contribute to a regionally based counter-piracy coordination
47
disrupt and dismantle pirate bases ashore[;] and conclude
center[;]
agreements and arrangements to formalize custody and prosecution
48
arrangement.

The United States Coast Guard announced additional precautions: All vessels
sailing under United States flag through the Horn of Africa must have an
approved anti-piracy security plan on file and must post guards on the ship.49
In addition to requiring flagged ships to register anti-piracy plans, the
Department of State has been investigating the possibility of arming ships or of
allowing private security firms to escort ships.50

43. Id. ¶ 9.
44. Press Release, Int’l Mar. Org., High-Level Meeting in Djibouti Adopts a Code of
Conduct to Repress Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (Jan. 30, 2009), available
at http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1773&doc_id=10933.
45. IMO, Guidance to Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on
Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, at 12,
MSC.1/Circ. 1334 (June 23, 2009).
46. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 15, at 52; see also NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, COUNTERING
PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA: PARTNERSHIP & ACTION PLAN (2008); Press Release,
Memorandum on the Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy (June 14, 2007), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070614-3.html.
47. This parallels the ReCAAP, the agreement between Southeast Asian nations including
heavy patrolling and monitoring that is credited for greatly reducing the number of piracy
incidents in the Straits of Malacca, the most dangerous waterways in the world from the 1980s
until the late 1990s. See generally ZOU Keyuan, New Developments in the International Law of
Piracy, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 323 (2009).
48. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 15, at 52 (citing NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 46).
49. Carbin, supra note 9, at 54.
50. Id. at 53–54.
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Other international industry groups are also working to help ships avoid
attack.
The MSCHOA established a heavily-patrolled Internationally
Recommended Marine Corridor where all ships should travel.51 Additionally,
the International Marine Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) maintains a
live piracy report, posting details, photos, and coordinates of recent attacks and
suspected pirate ships.52 The PRC links to international recommendations and
highlights trouble spots worldwide, as well as encourages all ships to report
any attempted attack immediately.53 The Philippines announced that in 2010,
it would require all citizen sailors to complete an anti-piracy course; over 470
Filipino sailors have been held hostage over the last five years.54
C. The Need for Modernized Private Practices
Despite the intergovernmental and nongovernmental actions outlined
above, the number of attacks in 2009 (406) is substantially higher than the
number of attacks during the same period in 2008 (293).55 Though the number
of attacks for January through June 2010 is lower in the Gulf of Aden, the
attacks have moved farther offshore.56 According to the PRC’s live piracy
report on November 15, 2009, there were ten attempted attacks in the Gulf of
Aden or off the coast of Somalia in the previous ten days, two of which
resulted in hostage situations.57 Only eleven attacks were reported across the
world during this time period.58 As of December 31, 2009, Somali pirates held
approximately 263 crewmembers hostage.59
As is clear from the persistence and increasing sophistication of attacks,
the end, or even minimization, of piracy in Somalia is not yet in sight. The
area is geographically vast, and pirates use small craft.60 Private entities must
coordinate as soon as possible: Waiting for an international compact or even
51. Piracy Prone Areas and Warnings, supra note 20.
52. See IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS., http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=30&Itemid=12 (last visited June 20,
2011).
53. Id.
54. Philippines Orders Sailors To Take Anti-Piracy Classes, BBC NEWS (Jan. 4, 2010,
11:58 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8439198.stm.
55. ICC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
56. See ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS: REPORT
FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY–30 JUNE 2010 5–6 (2010) [hereinafter ICC QUARTERLY REPORT]
(showing a decrease in the amount of attacks in the Gulf of Aden and an increase in the attacks in
other offshore areas, including the Red Sea).
57. Live Piracy Report, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS. (citing data as reported Nov. 15,
2009) (on file with author).
58. Id.
59. ICC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 21.
60. See Cowell, supra note 8 (describing a pirate attack in which the pirates used a skiff 600
miles off the coast of Somalia).
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military suppression could take several more years at least, if the crackdown on
piracy in the Straits of Malacca is indicative.61 Currently, just as there is no
one-plan-fits-all solution for insuring a voyage, there is no set solution
regarding who pays for what if a hostage situation arises.62 Insurers should
incentivize preventive behaviors and clearly state when ransom will be covered
and by whom.
II. HISTORY OF MARINE INSURANCE
A.

Marine Insurance in General63
1.

Development of Coverage

Marine insurance has existed almost as long as humans have been using
the waters to ship goods. Research shows that ancient Chinese merchants split
their cargoes between several vessels, thereby spreading the risk of loss among
merchants.64 The Code of Hammurabi, dating from 2300 B.C., contained
“bottomry” provisions.65 Under bottomry, if there was a mortgage on the ship,
the owner would be indemnified in case of a total loss; if the ship arrived
safely, however, the owner would pay over a substantial portion of his profits
to the insurer.66 This practice was incorporated into Roman law as early as 50
B.C.67 Justinian limited insurance rates on this “foenus nauticum” to 12% in
A.D. 533.68 There is evidence that the Lombards and the Hanseatic League
practiced a form of marine insurance in their shipping businesses in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.69 Codification and standardization began
in the Middle Ages: The Barcelona Ordinance of 1435 standardized
continental policies.70 The modern English policies evolved from the

61. The Straits of Malacca were formerly the most dangerous waterways in the world, but
thanks to strong multinational cooperation in Southeast Asia, only two attacks occurred in 2009.
ICC QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 56, at 5.
62. Evidence of ransom payments is difficult to obtain. See infra Part V.
63. For a more detailed history of the evolution of marine insurance, see generally VICTOR
DOVER, A HANDBOOK TO MARINE INSURANCE: BEING A GUIDE TO THE HISTORY, LAW AND
PRACTICE OF AN INTEGRAL PART OF COMMERCE, FOR THE BUSINESS MAN AND THE STUDENT
(2d ed. 1924); D. McKellar, Marine Insurance—An Ancient Art that Meets Modern Demands, 16
VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 161 (1986).
64. CHRISTOPHER HILL ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO P & I 1 (2d ed. 1996) (describing the
ancient predecessors to the P & I Club).
65. D. McKellar, supra note 63, at 161.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. DOVER, supra note 63, at 16.
69. Id. at 19–21.
70. Id. at 22.
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Ordinance of Florence, authored in 1523.71 This is the wording that the early
English underwriters adopted.72 The Royal Exchange was founded in London
in 1570,73 which became the main center for marine insurance brokerage in
England after the powerful Hanseatic League was expelled from Great Britain
in 1597.74
2.

The English System and Lloyd’s

By the mid-1600s, English underwriting occurred mostly at coffee shops
near ports.75 The most famous of these was Edward Lloyd’s shop, established
in 1687.76 The Lloyd’s system began informally, with merchants writing their
names under the description of a particular voyage as a sign of their agreement
to indemnify a portion of the voyage in exchange for a premium.77 Parliament
officially incorporated Lloyd’s in an 1871 act.78 Additionally, the company
“oversees and regulates the competition for underwriting business . . . [and]
has statutory powers . . . to regulate the affairs of the international insurance
market in London” under the Lloyd’s Acts of 1871 and 1982.79
The Lloyd’s system is unique and complex. “Names,” individuals who
pool their resources to underwrite marine risks, deposit funds with Lloyd’s.80
This amount determines the amount of risk that a Name is allowed to
underwrite.81 A member’s agent acts as a fiduciary for the Name, helping it to
join a syndicate or underwriting agency.82 A Name normally underwrites in 40
to 100 different syndicates.83 Agents of the syndicates maintain booths on the
floor at Lloyd’s.84 Ship owners hire a certified Lloyd’s broker to represent
their risks to the syndicates on the Lloyd’s floor.85 The broker presents a
broker’s slip summarizing the risk to a particular syndicate.86 The first

71. D. McKellar, supra note 63, at 162.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. DOVER, supra note 63, at 21.
75. D. McKellar, supra note 63, at 162.
76. Id.
77. Jeremy A. Herschaft, Not Your Average Coffee Shop: Lloyd’s of London—A TwentyFirst-Century Primer on the History, Structure, and Future of the Backbone of Marine Insurance,
29 TUL. MAR. L.J. 169, 174 (2005).
78. Lloyd’s Act, 1871, 34 Vict., c. 21 (Eng.).
79. Herschaft, supra note 77, at 174 (quoting Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London,
148 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir. 1998)).
80. Id. at 175–76.
81. Id. at 176
82. Id. at 176.
83. Id. at 177.
84. Herschaft, supra note 77, at 177.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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syndicate to sign on is the “lead underwriter.”87 Subsequent underwriters may
adhere to the same terms, or request different ones if there is no “full-follow”
clause requiring all underwriters to adhere to the same terms.88 Once 100% of
the risk is allocated, the risk is considered insured, even before the final
contract is drawn up.89 This complex system of risk-spreading underscores the
difficulties inherent in insuring a major commercial venture.
3.

The Development of General Average and P & I Clubs

General average is a concept that developed independently of, but parallel
to, contractual marine insurance agreements.90 Historians estimate that this
system originated between 900 and 700 B.C. and was incorporated in the law
of Rhodes in A.D. 200: “Let that which has been jettisoned on behalf of all be
restored by the contribution of all.”91 The York-Antwerp Rules, revised
several times over, still govern the principles of general average.92 Rule A
defines a “general average act” as one where “any extraordinary sacrifice or
expenditure is intentionally and reasonably made or incurred for the common
safety for the purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in a
common maritime adventure.”93 General average was traditionally linked to
property or commerce, but courts have implied that an expenditure to save
human life should qualify in some limited cases as a general average act,
allowing contribution.94 General average is now instituted by clauses in bills
of lading that incorporate the York-Antwerp Rules.95 Formerly, “substituted”
expenses (expenses incurred to prevent the necessity of jettisoning cargo, for

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 178.
Id. at 179.
Herschaft, supra note 77, at 178.
DOVER, supra note 63, at 17. An “average” is a loss of some kind. F.D. ROSE,
GENERAL AVERAGE: LAW AND PRACTICE 2 (1997). A particular average is one that is
attributable to a particular party (e.g., the first mate for poor steering, the installer for a faulty
part, etc.). Id. A general average, however, is a loss that is undertaken for the safety of the
voyage. Id. Traditionally, this meant jettison of cargo (as in throwing cargo overboard to avoid
sinking) or cutting down a ship’s mast to avoid imminent peril. Id.
91. DOVER, supra note 63, at 17.
92. ROSE, supra note 90, at 2.
93. 2004 YORK-ANTWERP RULES, § A, ¶ 1 (emphasis added), available at http://www.co
mitemaritime.org/Uploads/YAR%202004%20english.doc. A very similar definition is found in
the British Marine Insurance Act: “There is a general average act where any extraordinary
sacrifice or expenditure is voluntarily and reasonably made or incurred in a time of peril for the
purpose of preserving the property imperiled in the common adventure.” Marine Insurance Act,
1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, § 66(2) (Eng.) (discussed infra).
94. ROSE, supra note 90, at 15 (citing Montgomery & Co. v. Indem. Mut. Marine Ins. Co.,
[1902] 1 KB 734, 740).
95. Id. at 10.
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example) could not be claimed through general average at common law.96
York-Antwerp Rule F changed this exclusion, encouraging ships’ masters to
take preventive action where appropriate.97 All parties that could potentially
be required to contribute to general average expenses routinely procure
insurance for such expenses.98 If general average is invoked, an independent
adjuster calculates the proportional loss and contribution of each party, which
sometimes takes years; then the parties must sort out disputes in arbitration and
the courts.99
Protection and indemnity clubs, now known as P & I Clubs, are essentially
mutual assurance groups of insurers.100 Their predecessors date back to
ancient China and India, as well as the medieval guilds.101 The hull club, the
direct predecessor of the P & I Club, grew out of ship owners’ dissatisfaction
with the available marine insurance: many of these clubs specialized in a
particular risk that was considered too expensive or risky to be covered by
normal marine insurance.102 These clubs also allowed the owners to insure
voyages for more than the value of their vessel; they were normally limited to
the ship’s appraised value by the Marine Insurance Act of 1745.103 If a
collision or similar occurred, causing damage greater than the appraised value
of the ship itself, the ship owner would have a resource for the additional
liability from loss of cargo or personal injury.104 Today’s P & I Clubs function
as corporations, funded by premiums and calls, where members vote to
approve or deny claims.105
B.

The American System of Marine Insurance
1.

An English Example

The American system of marine insurance is derived from the English
example. The earliest recorded instance of marine insurance originating in the
United States dates to 1721, when a Mr. John Copson of Philadelphia
advertised a marine underwriting operation at his home because American
settlers had “been obliged to send to London for such Assurance, which has

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 59.
Id. at 60 (citing 1994 YORK-ANTWERP RULES, § F).
WILLIAM TETLEY, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME AND ADMIRALTY LAW 391 (2002).
ROSE, supra note 90, at 12.
HILL ET AL., supra note 64, at 1.
Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 2–4.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
HILL ET AL., supra note 64, at 9–10.
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not only been tedious and troublesome, but even very precarious.”106 The first
official company, the Insurance Company of North America, was established
in 1792.107 One author estimates that by 1845, there were seventy-five or more
American marine insurance companies.108 This growth in the field has “kept
pace with the tremendous development of the resources of the world’s richest
continent” since then.109
2.

Admiralty Law and the Common Law

In the United States, federal courts have original jurisdiction over
admiralty and maritime matters.110 The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal
district courts jurisdiction over admiralty or maritime claims, whether they are
private civil matters or criminal matters.111 The British Parliament passed the
Marine Insurance Act, 1906, which codified the British common law of marine
insurance.112 This statute was considered so well-written that it was “copied
almost verbatim in most of the countries of the Commonwealth.”113 Similar
statutes codifying marine laws exist in European countries, including France,
Italy, Spain, and Germany.114 The European Union, South Africa, Australia,
and China all have legislation in effect governing marine insurance.115 The
United States is somewhat unique, then, among modern industrial nations in
that marine insurance is not governed by federal statute, even though federal
courts have jurisdiction over admiralty matters.116 Instead, United States
courts rely on the general maritime law, an American version of the lex
mercatoria as existed in civilian Europe.117 The 1906 English Act has been
very persuasive in United States court decisions.118

106. LESLIE J. BUGLASS, MARINE INSURANCE CLAIMS: AMERICAN LAW AND PRACTICE 1
(2d ed. 1972).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
111. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 76–77 (1789) (establishing the judicial courts of the
United States).
112. Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, § 66(2) (Eng.); see also TETLEY, supra
note 98, at 583.
113. TETLEY, supra note 98, at 583.
114. Id. at 584 & n.26.
115. Id. at 584, 587–88.
116. Id. at 585.
117. Id.
118. TETLEY, supra note 98, at 585–86.
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The Wilburn Boat Doctrine

The Wilburn brothers and their houseboat-turned-ferry caused an upheaval
in marine insurance practice in the United States in 1955. The brothers had
been using their houseboat to transport commercial passengers across Lake
Texoma when the boat was destroyed by fire.119 The brothers tried to recover,
but their claim was denied because the boat was insured for personal use
only.120 In Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., the Supreme
Court held that there was no federally-established admiralty rule governing
marine insurance contracts, and therefore state insurance law should govern
these contracts.121 This was contrary to prior Supreme Court and English
admiralty decisions.122 Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result on the
grounds that the matter of a small boat on an inland lake was local rather than
national in character.123 This decision caused American law governing marine
insurance to diverge somewhat from its English cousin,124 as well as to become
a bit unpredictable for underwriters.125 One author observes that lower courts
have avoided this undesirable rule by:
[R]outine application of state law; appearing to find, without discussion, a
well-developed admiralty rule in the American decisions; finding such a rule
with the aid of English decisions; and finding that the state law does not differ
substantially from the “maritime law” . . . and that the state has no substantial
interest in the application of its law. Finally, the court may simply ignore
126
Wilburn.

4.

The American Institute of Marine Underwriters

The American Institute of Marine Underwriters (AIMU) attempts to help
American underwriters navigate the complex system of risk allocation and
United States case law by developing form contracts and lobbying on the
industry’s behalf.127 Somali piracy is currently one of the hot issues that
AIMU is tracking, hoping to help its members develop appropriate coverage

119. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 311 (1955).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 316, 321.
122. Graydon S. Staring, Admiralty and Maritime Law: Selected Topics, 26 TORT & INS. L.J.
538, 543 (1991).
123. Wilburn, 348 U.S. at 321–22.
124. TETLEY, supra note 98, at 586.
125. Staring, supra note 122, at 545.
126. Id. at 544 (footnotes omitted).
127. AM. INST. OF MARINE UNDERWRITERS (AIMU), http://www.aimu.org/ (last visited June
7, 2010).
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for this new risk.128 The AIMU policies have become the new American
standard for marine insurance contracts, as outlined below.
III. MODERN AMERICAN MARINE POLICIES: LANGUAGE AND COVERAGE
Piracy is arguably as old as shipping by sea, mentioned in the Justinian
Digest of A.D. 529,129 which also discussed marine insurance.130 The bandits
were historically labeled hostis humanis generis (the enemy of all mankind)
and Ishmaelites (persons without a country).131 Shippers have been insuring
against the risk of pirates for almost as long as they have been insuring,
developing a group of form clauses that can be pieced together to protect
against various threats inherent in different voyages.132 Several approaches to
allocating the risk of piracy have emerged through practice over the years, as
outlined below.133
A.

Hull Policies and “Perils” Clauses
The American Institute Hull Clauses include a standard “perils” clause:
Touching the Adventures and Perils which the Underwriters are contented to
bear and take upon themselves, they are of the Seas, Men-of-War, Fire,
Lightning, Earthquake, Enemies, Pirates, Rovers, Assailing Thieves, Jettisons,
Letters of Mart and Counter-Mart, Surprisals, Takings at Sea, Arrests,
Restraints and Detainments of all Kings, Princes and Peoples, of what nation,
condition or quality soever, Barratry of the Master and Mariners and of all
other like Perils, Losses and Misfortunes that have or shall come to the Hurt,
Detriment or Damage of the Vessel, or any part thereof, excepting, however,
such of the foregoing perils as may be excluded by provisions elsewhere in the
134
Policy or by endorsement thereon.

128. AIMU, AIMU ISSUES BOOK *1–2 (2009). In addition, the group is tracking legislation
relating to marine insurance and terrorism, a subject that may be highly relevant to protecting
ships from Somali piracy. Id. at *4–5.
129. ZOU, supra note 47, at 323.
130. DOVER, supra note 63, at 16.
131. Carbin, supra note 9, at 51.
132. Raymond P. Hayden & Sanford E. Balick, Marine Insurance: Varieties, Combinations,
and Coverages, 66 TUL. L. REV. 311, 315 n.5 (1991) (“It is questionable whether any policy is so
straightforward and without alteration as to be truly ‘typical.’ There are, for instance, several hull
forms available in the marine market. In practice, these policies become a patchwork of standard
clauses drawn from various sources and customized to reflect the intentions of the parties to the
particular contract.”) (citation omitted).
133. See generally Eric Danoff, Marine Insurance for Loss or Damage Caused by Terrorism
or Political Violence, 16 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 61, 62–73 (2003–2004) (providing an overview of
marine insurance coverage terms).
134. AIMU, AMERICAN INSTITUTE HULL CLAUSES ll. 70–74 (1977), available at
http://www.aimu.org/aimuforms/7.pdf.
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This section appears to include the risks of piracy, and for many years was
interpreted as such.135 However, this same form policy later excludes threats
from piracy under the War Strikes and Related Exclusions Clause:
The following conditions shall be paramount and shall supersede and
nullify any contrary provisions of the Policy.
This Policy does not cover any loss, damage or expense caused by,
resulting from, or incurred as a consequence of:
(a) Capture, seizure, arrest, restraint or detainment, or any attempt thereat; or
(b) Any taking of the Vessel, by requisition or otherwise, whether in time of
peace or war and whether lawful or otherwise; or
(c) Any mine, bomb or torpedo not carried as cargo on board the Vessel; or
(d) Any weapon of war employing atomic or nuclear fission and/or fusion or
other like reaction or radioactive force or matter; or
(e) Civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection, or civil strife arising
therefrom, or piracy; or
(f) Strikes, lockouts, political or labor disturbances, civil commotions, riots,
martial law, military or usurped power; or
(g) Malicious acts or vandalism, unless committed by the Master or Mariners
and not excluded elsewhere under this War Strikes and Related Exclusions
clause; or
(h) Hostilities or warlike operations (whether there be a declaration of war or
not) but this subparagraph (h) not to exclude collision or contact with
aircraft, rockets or similar missiles, or with any fixed or floating object, or
stranding, heavy weather, fire or explosion unless caused directly by a
hostile act by or against a belligerent power which act is independent of
the nature of the voyage or service which the Vessel concerned or, in the
case of a collision, any other vessel involved therein, is performing. As
used herein, “power” includes any authority maintaining, naval, military or
air forces in association with a power.
If war risks or other risks excluded by this clause are hereafter insured by
endorsement on this Policy, such endorsement shall supersede the above
conditions only to the extent that the terms of such endorsement are
136
inconsistent therewith and only while such endorsement remains in force.

Clearly, this provision exempts from coverage the acts of piracy allegedly
covered by the earlier perils clause. Even if the form hull policy is not used,
these above-mentioned risks are normally excluded through the use of the Free
of Capture and Seizure Clause (F.C. & S.),137 which contains substantially
similar language to the War Strikes and Related Exclusions Clause excerpted
135. Passman, supra note 24, at 60–61.
136. AIMU, supra note 134, ll. 239–55.
137. Danoff, supra note 133, at 63–64.
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above, and also expressly exempts coverage of piracy.138 It is important to
note that the general hull policy contains insurance for general average losses
the policyholder might incur.139 These exempted risks are insurable, but ship
owners must purchase a separate War Risks policy to obtain coverage. This
policy is essentially the opposite wording of the above, with some additions.
The essential portion is the first clause, a basic statement of coverage:
This insurance is only against the risks of capture, seizure, destruction or
damage by men-of-war, piracy, takings at sea, arrests, restraints, detainments
and other warlike operations and acts of kings, princes and peoples in
prosecution of hostilities or in the application of sanctions under international
agreements, whether before or after declaration of war and whether by a
belligerent or otherwise, including factions engaged in civil war, revolution,
rebellion or insurrection, or civil strife arising therefrom; the imposition of
martial law, military or usurped power, and including the risks of aerial
bombardment, floating or stationary mines and stray or derelict torpedoes, and
weapons of war employing atomic or nuclear fission and/or fusion or other
reaction or radioactive force or matter but excluding loss, damage or expense
arising out of the hostile use of any such weapon and warranted not to abandon
(on any ground other than physical damage to ship or cargo) until after
140
condemnation of the property insured.

Exempting war risks from general hull coverage makes sense in terms of
allocating risk: Those vessels that are traveling a safer route, or who choose to
take on the risk of piracy do not have to pay the additional premium for this
coverage. The costs of the acts of piracy are spread among those who choose
to travel more perilous routes or who wish to have this added peace of mind.
However, the costs of War Risks policies for the Gulf of Aden have
increased tenfold since mid-2008.141 One recent attack was 1000 nautical
miles off the coast of Somalia, a distance far greater than previous attacks.142
Statistics gathered by the International Chamber of Commerce/International
Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) indicate that attacks in the
area during 2009 kept pace with those in 2008, and are spreading farther from
the coast and northward into the Red Sea.143 Some ships traveling this distance

138. See AIMU, F.C. & S. CLAUSE (HULLS) (1959), available at http://www.aimu.org./aimu
forms/87B-59.pdf.
139. For more discussion of General Average, see supra Part III.A.3. It will be interesting to
see if any cases arise where the victims of a pirate attack who do not carry a separate war risks
policy would be able to file a claim for general average, or if the court would read this to be
precluded by the War Strikes Clause.
140. AIMU, WAR RISK ONLY OPEN POLICY (CARGO) ¶ 1 (1981), available at
http://www.aimu.org/formsmenunumber.html.
141. AIMU ISSUES BOOK, supra note 128, at 1–2.
142. Somalia: Pirates Attack Oil Tanker, supra note 14.
143. ICC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 5–6, 21.
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from the shoreline might have chosen to take the remote risk of a pirate attack
and forego the high cost of a War Risks policy. Alternatively, they might all
purchase the policy because the premium is still cheaper than diverting
shipments around the Cape of Good Hope.144 Arguably, then, the separation of
liability for piracy is spread between the appropriate parties, but the costs to
insurers may soon be too great to continue insuring these risky voyages.
B.

A Clear Definition of Piracy145

Another layer in the already complex debate about how to solve the
problems piracy poses for international shipping is settling on a definition of
piracy. Hull risks and general average were originally formulated to cover
risks to vessel and cargo,146 and piracy involved acts of “robbery and
depredation” on the high seas against that property.147 American statutes
incorporate the UNCLOS definition, which includes any act of violence or
depredation done on the high seas for personal gain against the crew of a
ship.148 Alternatively, the International Maritime Bureau defines piracy as
“[a]n act of boarding any vessel with the apparent intent to commit theft or any
other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the
furtherance of that act.”149 In the United States, case law indicates that
“piracy” as defined in a marine insurance contract may consist of
(1) an act of depredation (not limited to robbery), (2) by persons not
recognized as belligerents by the political branches of the government or by
foreign governments, (3) on the “high seas” (as that term is popularly used),
(4) for private ends, and (5) in the spirit of general or universal aggression
150
against all.

Though the term “piracy” has traditionally been broadly construed by
marine insurers, covering a number of different types of attacks on a ship,151
there is a risk of equivocation on the point if the term is not defined in the
contract. Somali pirates, unlike traditional pirates, do not wish to steal the
cargo or the vessel: Instead, they threaten violence against human lives and
costs in the form of ransom and delay of delivery of goods, essentially

144. See Carbin, supra note 9, at 53 (indicating that the easiest tactic to repel pirate attacks is
to avoid that area of the sea, but that such a strategy has increased costs).
145. For an in-depth discussion of how the definition of piracy affects international law, see
generally Buhler, supra note 11.
146. ROSE, supra note 90, at 5–6.
147. Buhler, supra note 11, at 63 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 72 (9th
ed. 1783)).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 2280(a) (2006); UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 101.
149. ICC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 3.
150. Passman, supra note 24, at 84–85 (footnotes omitted).
151. Id. at 67–68.
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extorting a toll to pass through their waters safely.152 Considering this new
incarnation of crime at sea, defining the term in an insurance contract might
provide better protection for insureds, as well as insurers—but it could also
provide a technicality upon which an insurer could deny coverage.153 It is easy
to imagine such a coverage dispute arising if insurers begin experiencing an
even higher number of claims for hostage-for-ransom situations without
defining “piracy” in their policies.
C. Modern General Average and P & I Club Coverage
As noted above, general average is usually insured against by all parties to
a “common adventure.”154 The clause included in AIMU cargo and hull risks
policies states:
General Average and Salvage shall be payable as provided in the contract of
affreightment, or failing such provision or there be no contract of
affreightment, payable at the Assured’s election either in accordance with
York-Antwerp Rules 1950 or 1974 or with the Laws and Usages of the Port of
New York. Provided always that when an adjustment according to the laws
and usages of the port of destination is properly demanded by the owners of
the cargo, General Average shall be paid accordingly.
....
When the contributory value of the Vessel is greater than the Agreed Value
herein, the liability of the Underwriters for General Average contribution
(except in respect to amounts made good to the Vessel), or Salvage, shall not
exceed that proportion of the total contribution due from the Vessel which the
amount insured hereunder bears to the contributory value, and if, because of
damage for which the Underwriters are liable as Particular Average, the value
of the Vessel has been reduced for the purpose of contribution, the amount of
such Particular Average damage recoverable under this Policy shall first be
deducted from the amount insured hereunder, and the Underwriters shall then
be liable only for the proportion which such net amount bears to the
155
contributory value.

General average rules have not changed much, but their application that has
changed over the years, with parties to common adventures insuring against
general average losses.156 The lengthy determination of who is at fault and for
how much, however, remains an administrative hurdle to sharing losses.157

152. Id. at 87–88.
153. Contra id. at 88 (arguing that defining such terms would help insurers price risk,
benefitting both parties to an insurance contract).
154. See supra Part III.A.3.
155. AIMU, supra note 134, ll. 120–23, 128–33.
156. ROSE, supra note 90, at 8–9.
157. See id. at 12 (describing the role of an average adjuster).
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Thus it seems insurers of general average expenses—who are also insurers of
voyages—have an incentive to clearly define who will cover ransom expenses
incurred in modern piracy incidents. Otherwise, their total risk on a particular
voyage remains unpredictable.
P & I Clubs sometimes include a clause in their rules that allow the
directors to pay a claim that may not be specifically covered elsewhere in their
rules.158 For example, the American Club’s “omnibus” provision allows such
discretion: “Liability for costs and expenses not expressly excluded elsewhere
in these Rules, incidental to the business of owning, operating or managing
ships which the Directors, in their sole discretion, shall consider to fall within
the scope of the insurance protection afforded by the Association under these
Rules.”159 These policies only cover those amounts which hull policies would
not cover.160 Additionally, this policy only provides coverage for the war risks
of piracy and barratry.161 Some P & I Club rules now expressly exclude
coverage for terrorism.162 Even though piracy has always been a risk at sea,
the new system of hijacking-for-ransom via small craft and a few heavilyarmed individuals is in some ways more akin to modern terrorism at sea than
to traditional piracy. One can imagine that P & I Clubs might eventually be
forced to exclude coverage for ransoms due to the repeated high costs
potentially incurred by members.
D. Kidnap and Ransom Insurance
There is some limited evidence that kidnap and ransom policies insuring
the crew of a ship against such threats are taking hold. The AIMU has not yet
developed or endorsed such a policy, though some syndicates at Lloyd’s offer
them.163 According to advertisements, the policy may include negotiation
experts.164 Some companies now offer a “comprehensive package,” which
sounds like a good idea in the face of complicated piecemeal policies covering
every separate aspect of a major commercial sea voyage.165 Corporations have
used similar policies to protect their employees that go abroad to dangerous

158. Danoff, supra note 133, at 71.
159. THE AMERICAN CLUB, 2011/2012 BY-LAWS, RULES & LIST OF CORRESPONDENTS 55
(2011), available at http://www.american-club.com/rulebooks/1112.pdf.
160. Id. at 59–60.
161. Id. at 56.
162. Danoff, supra note 133, at 71.
163. Maritime Kidnap and Ransom Insurance Growing, INT’L EXEC. SEC. MONITOR (Oct. 7,
2009), http://kidnapandransom.net/2009/10/maritime-kidnap-and-ransom-insurance-growing/.
164. Unique & Related Coverages: Kidnap and Ransom Insurance, MERCATOR RISK SERVS.,
INC., http://www.mercatorpro.com/products/unique_amp_related_coverages/kidnap_and_ransom
_insurance.html (last visited June 20, 2011).
165. See, e.g., SCR and MUSC Launch Vessel Shield to Solve Piracy Coverage Dilemma, INS.
SERVS. NETWORK (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.isn-inc.com/news/news.aspx?nid=1084&cid=4.
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regions for work.166 Undisputedly, paying ransoms legitimizes the actions of
the pirates.167 Encouraging the purchase of such coverage would, extended ad
absurdum, lead to consumers paying lawless individuals for the privilege of
buying goods which passed through international waters, making ransom part
of the cost of doing business. This would certainly conflict with the stated
goals of the United Nations Security Council—and hopefully meet with
widespread public protestation. However, some payments may not be
avoidable at this early stage of the fight against Somali pirates.
IV. THE ETHICAL DILEMMA OF PAYING RANSOMS
It is very difficult to obtain accurate data on ransom payments, possibly
because some ship owners may not be reporting payments if they have the cash
resources to allow them to deal off the grid. Hostage situations create
significant concern for American-flagged ships, as their crews and cargoes are
in imminent danger.168 Those who pay ransoms now do so in direct
contravention of the wishes of the United Nations Security Council, of which
the United States is a permanent member.169
One attorney posits several propositions about ransom payments, but fails
to cite the sources for his numbers or theories. James W. Carbin states that in
September 2009 the total amount paid in ransom for hostages held by Somali
pirates was projected to reach $50 million soon.170 The anecdotal reports of
individual, per-craft payments show ransoms are normally in the single-digit
millions of dollars.171 Carbin suggests that ransoms are being paid in two
ways: by voluntary contribution of the parties to a voyage or by advancement
of funds by particular interests who then invoke general average.172 Carbin
argues that, in the first case, the insurance policy which covers the risk of
piracy (in United States policies, the War Risks policy) voluntarily contributes
to the ransom, as does, potentially, P & I Clubs and Hijack and Ransom
insurance.173 In the second instance, a general average adjuster would be
appointed after the doctrine is invoked to discern the values of each party’s

166. See Nicholas Schmidle, The Hostage Business, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 6, 2009, at 44.
167. A market for kidnapping oil workers is still thriving in Nigeria, allegedly due partially to
the lucrative nature of payments from insurance companies. Id.
168. The United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act only bans payments to foreign
government officials or other parties who negotiate business with said foreign governments.
Carbin, supra note 9, at 55 (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 78(dd) (2006)). Thus, paying ransom to the
pirates does not run afoul of this provision. Id.
169. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 40, ¶ 9.
170. Carbin, supra note 9, at 54.
171. Id. at 55.
172. Id. at 54.
173. Id. Carbin also notes here that it is not yet certain whether the P & I and hijack and
ransom insurers will seek subrogation from the other insurers of the adventure. Id.
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interest in the venture.174 This value, interestingly, does not include a
valuation of the lives of the crew, assessing only property values.175 It seems
smart general average insurers will soon find a way around funding ransom,
which is a substitute expenditure.176 Though Carbin argues that United States
courts have approved the use of general average funds to pay ransom by
positively citing a British case in an 1894 decision (Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S.
386 (1894)),177 it seems unlikely (or at least unwise) that a court would
condone paying ransoms not explicitly provided for in the policy, contrary to
the express U.S. public policy condemning such payments.
V. LEARNING FROM THE PAST: MARINE INDUSTRY RESPONSES TO PREVIOUS
CATASTROPHIC DISTURBANCES
A.

The Exxon-Valdez and Changes at Lloyd’s

As shipping is one of the world’s oldest industries, the insurance markets
have experience responding to major disturbances in the market that appear
from time to time throughout the centuries. One example is the major
structural change undertaken by Lloyd’s in the aftermath of the Exxon-Valdez
incident.178 This loss, along with several others in the late 1980s and early
1990s, forced the stately insurer to post major losses averaging $461,000 per
member. 179 These losses, along with the fact that members were continually
exposed to potentially unlimited personal liability in the future, led to a mass
Lloyd’s quickly changed its rules, allowing
exodus of members.180
corporations to become members for the first time; since directors and
shareholders in corporations are protected against unlimited personal liability
by the very nature of the corporate entity, this change eliminated the
unattractive exposure to personal liability that formerly accompanied
membership at Lloyd’s.181 Over the years, corporate membership increased,
and individual membership decreased.182 There are now several types of

174. See ROSE, supra note 90, at 12 (describing the role of an average adjuster in determining
claims).
175. Carbin, supra note 9, at 54.
176. Substitute expenditures are those that are used to avoid potential damage or delay to the
ship, and traditionally were not covered by general average without prior approval. This was
altered by York-Antwerp Rule F. ROSE, supra note 90, at 59–60; see also 1994 YORK-ANTWERP
RULES, § F.
177. Carbin, supra note 9, at 55.
178. Herschaft, supra note 77, at 183.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. Individual members are still subject to unlimited personal liability in the event of a
loss.
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corporate memberships, making membership an attractive investment
opportunity for a variety of types of companies.183 This fundamental change in
who absorbs the losses adds another layer of protection for investors and
insurers.
B.

New Form Clauses Specific to Certain Geographic Locations

Prior to aggressive cooperation efforts between Southeast Asian
governments, the waterways around Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines were pirate-riddled.184 Though the incidents in the Gulf of Aden
now far outnumber the attacks in these areas, the International Maritime
Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre still warns of a strong potential for attack.185
Attacks on docked ships are still relatively common in the Philippines, as well
as throughout South America.186 In response to these recurring problems, the
AIMU promulgated a Philippine Shipment Clause and a South American
Shipment Clause, insuring the cargoes of ships for a period of time once the
ship has arrived at its destination port but the voyage has technically ended.187
However, these clauses do not provide additional protection for crew members
who may be faced with these sudden attacks, usually at night, while docked.188
This may be because in those areas, the pirates are primarily trying to rob the
ship rather than extort money from the ship owners by ransoming the crew.
The very fact that the organization was willing to promulgate site-specific form
clauses evinces a need and a desire to specifically tailor coverage for
individual routes beyond the normal patchwork of general coverage shippers
obtain, allowing the shipper to account for additional risks and the insurer to
pass those costs of loss directly to those who take the risk of sailing that area.
Formulating a similar “Gulf of Aden” clause could be one option for reforming
the current approach to covering incidents in that area, as will be discussed in
further detail below.

183. Herschaft, supra note 77, at 183.
184. ZOU, supra note 47, at 338, 343.
185. Piracy Prone Areas and Warnings, supra note 20.
186. Id. Buhler, supra note 11, at 61 (noting a rash of attacks on Brazilian ports in the late
1990s).
187. AIMU, PHILIPPINE SHIPMENT CLAUSE, available at http://www.aimu.org/aimuforms/
SP-18.pdf; AIMU, SOUTH AMERICAN SHIPMENT CLAUSE, available at http://www.aimu.org/
aimuforms/SP-10A.pdf.
188. See, e.g., Buhler, supra note 11, at 61 (describing a midnight attack where the crew of a
vessel was held at knifepoint and gunpoint for money).
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C. Reinsurance and Terrorism
Marine reinsurance, the practice of insurers procuring indemnity insurance
from larger insurers, is likely as old as marine insurance itself.189 The first
recorded policy may have been written for a portion of an ancient trip from
Genoa to Sluys: The insurer retained the Mediterranean risk, but resinsured the
dangerous part of the route from Cadiz to Sluys.190 This further spreads the
risks of loss among players in the industry. Reinsurers normally cover both
marine and non-marine policies, are lightly regulated, and depend on familiar
principles to function (utmost good faith, stringent disclosure rules, and similar
warranties as in marine policies).191 Reinsurance of Gulf of Aden voyages is
likely already happening, but no formal statistics are available regarding what
routes or dollar proportion of policies insurers are reinsuring. One author
points out that when insurers are considering changes to policy language, they
must consider whether those changes will coalesce with reinsurance practices
since the insurers often depend on the reinsurers for particularly risky
ventures.192 Thus, when considering a comprehensive solution to insuring
ships in the Gulf of Aden, insurers must be mindful of their supporters in
reinsurance.
Marine terrorist attacks have been on the radar since the Achilles Lauro
incident in the early 1980s.193 Terrorism, like piracy, is a term of art in marine
insurance, defined as a politically motivated act of violence against a ship.194
In light of this definition, the hybrid nature of Somali piracy becomes clear:
while the Somalis’ actions are not politically motivated per se, they are acts of
violence directed against the people of the ship in order to extort money rather
than the traditional seizure of goods.195 Like modern piracy, acts of terrorism
are excluded from the AIMU Hull Policy, and there is continuing controversy
about how to cover such acts.196 The 2001 terrorist attacks in New York
caused a massive number of claims against numerous lines of insurance
(property-casualty, business interruption, life, health, etc.).197 The “shocking

189. GRAYDON S. STARING, LAW OF REINSURANCE 6 (2011).
190. Id.
191. Graydon S. Staring, Insurance and Reinsurance of Marine Interests in the New Age of
Terrorism, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1371, 1376 (2003).
192. Id. at 1377.
193. See Diaz & Dubner, supra note 12, at 540. This infamous incident where terrorists from
a smaller boat boarded the Italian-flagged ship in the Greek isles and pushed a paralyzed man
overboard in his wheelchair shocked the international community. See Malvina Halberstam,
Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime
Safety, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 269, 269 (1988).
194. See Diaz & Dubner, supra note 12, at 540.
195. Id.
196. AIMU, supra note 134, ll. 239–53; Staring, supra note 191, at 1386.
197. Staring, supra note 191, at 1377.
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amounts of loss and their unforeseeability . . . led many to doubt the market’s
capacity for unlimited risks of terrorism in the future.”198 This doubt led
insurers to refuse or limit coverage of the risk of terrorism, which the General
Accounting Office found had a chilling effect on development and
construction projects that need such coverage to obtain financing.199
In order to reassure these insurers and businesses, the federal government
passed a stopgap measure, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, to strengthen the
market.200 In effect, the act (which was renewed through 2014) is set up like a
reinsurance program: in the event of a catastrophic terrorist incident where
losses exceed $100 million,201 the Secretary of the Treasury, with concurrence
from the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, can activate the
coverage, and direct insurers can recover from the government or from another
reinsurer (not both).202 In exchange, insurers must cover damage caused by
terrorist attacks, and offer coverage for such acts similar to other coverage
available at the particular premium rate.203 Hence, businesses and insurers are
urged to continue in their normal productive patterns without worrying about
potential catastrophic losses from something so unpredictable as terrorism.
VI. AN INSURER’S APPROACH TO FIGHTING SOMALI PIRACY
A.

Revising the Applicable Clauses
1.

Defining and Redefining Piracy

There are several steps insurers could take to revise marine policy clauses
to make coverage clearer without losing the convenience of the form contract.
Since each venture poses a unique set of risks, it is important from a practical
standpoint that insurers are able to cobble together coverage by picking and
choosing from existing language. First, piracy should be redefined in
198. Id. at 1378.
199. Id. at 1378–79.
200. Terrorism and Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (2006)); see also Staring, supra note 191, at 1395. The measure
was initially set to expire in 2005, but was renewed by Congress through 2014 in 2007.
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-160, § 3(a), 121
Stat. 1839, 1839 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (Supp. 2008)).
201. 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (2006). In the 2002 version, the losses needed only to be $5 million.
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 102(1)(B)(ii), 116 Stat. at 2324 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
6701 (2006)). The amount was increased to $50 million in 2005, then to $100 million in 2007.
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 4, 121 Stat. at 1840 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 6701 (Supp. 2008)).
202. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 103, 116 Stat. at 2327–332 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 6701 (2006)). Insurers must also increase all subscribers’ premiums by 3% to attempt to
recover some of the money if claimed. Id. § 103(e)(8), 116 Stat. at 2330–231.
203. Id.
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international law to include hostile acts against the ship or her crew for the
purpose of extorting money, not just hostile acts against the ship to procure the
goods onboard. Much like denials of coverage that began after the terrorist
attacks of 9/11,204 it is not unimaginable that insurers might change their
broader conception of “piracy” to match the narrower one embodied in United
States law if they must continually reimburse for Somali pirate attacks. If the
definition is consistent throughout law and business, denying coverage on such
a technicality becomes much more difficult. Additionally, defining “piracy” in
the policy would help ship owners determine whether or not a particular
incident is covered under that portion of the policy.
2.

The “Gulf of Aden” Clause

In addition, or alternatively, insurers may want to consider a “Gulf of
Aden” clause, passing the costs on to those who desire to use the convenient
waterway despite the additional risks (and costs) of doing so. This clause
could be formulated to provide special coverage for kidnappings in this area.
Though paying ransoms is controversial as it undoubtedly rewards the bad acts
of the pirates, 205 the reality is that someone is paying.206 Creating a separate
clause for this type of coverage would be a good way to efficiently distribute
costs of this risk: Once shippers feel the area is politically stable and risks of
kidnapping are minimal, they no longer will pay for the coverage. This gives
governments and international actors time to solve the problem, and also gives
the marine insurance industry an easy way to revert to standard practices once
the problem is under control.
Additionally, offering such a clause will avoid the confusion and delay of
determining who will pay how much and when, as happens when general
average is invoked. The pay now, figure it out later strategy, due to its
complexity, should be saved for true one-off instances: The risks of travelling
the Gulf of Aden are now infamous. Further, insurers will no longer have to
perform slight-of-hand to pay ransoms while still appearing to be in
compliance with United Nations Security Council mandates. Kidnapping and
Ransom insurers often contract negotiations with the criminals out to a third
party in order to maintain clean hands; the same could be done here. But
insurers would no longer have to pretend that they would not cover these losses
that devastate their lifeblood industry.

204. See infra Part VII.B.
205. See Schmidle, supra note 166.
206. See Andrés Cala & Alan Cowell, After 6 Weeks, Somali Pirates Free Crew of Spanish
Vessel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at A10.
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Temporary Program of Government Reinsurance

As previously mentioned, portions of the Terrorist Risk Insurance Act
were extended in 2007 through December 2014.207 This act covers marine
insurance policies, but only on the “terrorism” front, which still requires that
the violent action be politically (rather than financially) motivated.208 The
United States would likely be reluctant to sponsor coverage for ransoms,
considering the United Nations Security Council condemns paying ransoms.209
There is likely a loophole way that costs could be covered while not condoning
or reimbursing for ransom expenses directly. Perhaps some sort of
consequential damages fund could be established to help pay claims resulting
from the delays in transit. This would offer reassurance to P & I Clubs who
might be considering dropping coverage, and also keep seafaring vessels
moving through the quickest route for trade. The insurance industry and
shippers, however, would likely benefit more from upfront definition of what
is and is not covered, and offering the option of a Gulf of Aden clause to
parties choosing to travel the dangerous route.
C. Worst-Case Scenario: To Pay or Not to Pay?
Paying ransom should be considered the last resort in a worst-case
scenario, even when the theoretical “Gulf of Aden” clause is purchased. There
is certainly moral grey area here. In fact, there is ample anecdotal evidence
that paying ransoms in this type of situation does perpetuate the crimes.210
However, the constant threat to human life makes paying ransoms difficult to
Insurers should require certain behaviors or procedures as
resist.211
antecedents to negotiating with pirates to incentivize preparation and
competence among their clients.
Insurers ought to require ship management to take anti-piracy courses.212
This is similar to giving people a discount on their automobile insurance

207. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
208. 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (2006).
209. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 40, ¶ 9.
210. Kidnapping in Nigeria was similarly big business. The kidnappers are accustomed to
negotiating with certain crisis management groups insurers employ. See Schmidle, supra note
166.
211. After being held hostage for a month, and Spanish sailors pleading with their families to
beg the government to give the pirates what they wanted, the ship was eventually freed. See
Cowell, supra note 8 (explaining that the Spanish prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero,
declined to comment on reports that a ransom of nearly $3.5 million had been paid for the
Alakrana and its crew. “The government did what it had to do,” he said).
212. The Philippines recently mandated that all of its citizens who sail on commercial ships
take an anti-piracy course before being allowed to sail in 2010 because 470 of its citizens have
been held for ransom in the past several years. See Philippines Orders Sailors To Take AntiPiracy Classes, supra note 54.
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premium for taking a driver’s education course: The risks of insuring such
people are theoretically lessened if they have the skills to help protect
themselves and their vehicle. So too with sailors and their ship. The IMO’s
“Recommendations to Shipowners” recommends training sailors to use fire
hoses, fences, or sonic devices to repel pirates at the first attempt to board.213
Even prior to employing those deterrent measures, they recommend employing
evasive maneuvering and reporting all attempted attacks to the International
Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre.214 In addition to merely training
the sailors in these measures, ship captains should be required to show that
they employed these techniques and followed their anti-piracy plan in order to
avoid capture in every way possible.215
Additionally, ships should be required to show that they were travelling in
the MSCHOA Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor where coalition
forces patrol. This area has still been the site of attacks, but the risks should be
diminished if ships stay within this patrolled area. Travelling within this
corridor, as well as following IMO’s recommended procedures, should be
requirements for covering ransom.
CONCLUSION
Piracy and insurance against piracy are nearly as old as shipping. The
Somali pirates have managed to turn the industry on its head by employing
new techniques: combining hostage-for-ransom with attacking ships passing
by. Initially unsophisticated, the pirates are growing bolder, employing mother
ships and creating an investment exchange. Yes, paying ransoms validates
their bad behavior, but as the Spanish Prime Minister said, sometimes you do
what you have to do.
Since this is a new incarnation of an old crime, no one is quite sure where
or how it is covered in the hodgepodge marine insurance policies that cover
individual voyages. The insurers largely seem to be crossing their fingers and
sending their clients on their way, hoping for the best. Anticipating the worst,
however, would be far more beneficial than scrambling when a ship is
attacked. Including a definition of piracy, and potentially a Gulf of Aden
clause, could aid both sides (and courts) in the event of a disagreement. Such
language could help determine who is to pay what, when. In addition, though

213. IMO, supra note 45, ¶¶ 56–57.
214. Id. ¶¶ 11, 55.
215. Some have argued that we should arm the ships, issuing temporary Letters of Marque
that authorize them as a merchant marine. This idea is not feasible, however, as it would require
uniform treatment of armed foreign ships in all foreign ports, and could lead to further liability
for shippers rather than reduced. See D. Joshua Staub, Letters of Marque: A Short-Term Solution
to an Age Old Problem, 40 J. MAR. L. & COM. 261, 266–69 (2009).
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the United States cannot condone paying ransom, 216 some sort of temporary
government fund could help alleviate the high cost of insuring against such
attacks, keeping sea traffic moving through the shortest travel routes. Finally,
before paying any ransom claim, insureds should have to prove that they were
following IMO recommendations and travelling in the MSCHOA corridor.
The United Nations, its member states, Somalia’s neighbors, and the
transitional government of Somalia are working diligently to police the area
and develop a long-term solution.
However, this takes time and
experimentation. In the meantime, insurers can assist by requiring training,
preparation, and strategy of their clients—and of themselves.
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